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SYMPOSIUM

"A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY":
UNDERSTANDING THE FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION

BY GARY LAWSON AND GUY SEIDMAN
The Elephant Problem
RICHARD PRIMUS*

ABSTRACT

In their new book, "A Great Power of Attorney": Understanding the
Fiduciary Constitution, Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman argue that, as a matter
of original meaning, the Constitution should be understood as analogous to a
power of attorney, that interpretive devices applicable to powers of attorney
should therefore be used in constitutional interpretation,and that interpreting
the Constitution that way would produce results congenial to modern libertarian preferences, such as the unconstitutionality of the Affordable Care Act and
the invalidity, on nondelegation grounds, of much of the federal administrative
state. But the book fails to carry any of its central arguments. As a historical
matter, there is virtually no evidence that the Founders thought of the
Constitution on the model of a power of attorney. The book's claim is about
original meaning, so that ought to be the end of the matter. But to go on: the
metaphor of the Constitution as a power of attorney nicely highlights the principle that governmental officials should act in the public interest rather than for
their own personal benefit. But it's only a metaphor. The idea that the
Constitution should be interpreted with the tools that would be used to interpret
a power of attorney does not follow, and without that interpretive consequence
the metaphor has no resolving power in contested cases.
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INTRODUCTION

In the summer of 1787, representatives of twelve American states gathered in
Philadelphia to create a more powerful central government. The old system of
concentrating power in the separate states had proven inadequate. Interstate protectionism brought economic trouble up and down the Atlantic Seaboard. The
British and Spanish were eating America's lunch. The new Constitution was
intended to put matters right by creating a national government with real powerpower sufficient to superintend the public welfare on a continental scale. The
adoption of that Constitution by the people of the United States was a major victory, and a fortunate one, for the empowerment of national government.
The same Constitution also limits the national government, and appropriately
so. A powerful government without mechanisms of limitation, like a powerful
automobile without good brakes, is a dangerous thing. Some of the best things
about American constitutional law-notably its protection of certain individual
rights-involve limiting government. But, just as an automobile is first and foremost a technology for getting from here to there, the Constitution is first and foremost a mechanism for operating a government rather than limiting one. The
safety features might save your life, but they are conceptually secondary to the
empowering ones. Indeed, in American constitutional law, even the glorious
rights-protecting safety features have done their work mostly by empowering the
national government-that is, by empowering national institutions to protect
individual rights against the abuses of states and localities rather than by checking
the federal government itself.'

1. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA.
L. REV. 1, 6-18 (1996) (describing the normal pattern of judicial review in individual rights cases as the
federal judiciary's imposition of national norms on outlier local jurisdictions).
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The book A Great Power of Attorney2 by Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman is
mostly interested in the Constitution as a device for limiting the national govemment. Lawson and Seidman build on the work of Robert Natelson, who has
argued that the Founders conceived of the Constitution as a fiduciary instrument
whose interpretation should be governed by principles of agency law.3 Lawson
and Seidman particularize that argument, saying that the Constitution should be
interpreted as if it were an eighteenth-century power of attorney.4 They emphasize certain consequences that might flow from thinking of the Constitution in
that way. In their telling, the powers conveyed in eighteenth-century powers of attorney were strictly construed, such that understanding the Constitution as a
power of attorney would mean systematically resolving questions about the scope
of federal power against the federal government.
The book's central claim-that the Constitution is like a power of attorneyhas some intuitive appeal. Like a power of attorney, the Constitution is a document that vests legal authority formally or initially belonging to X (a private client, or the people of the United States) in Y (an attorney, or the federal
government) on the understanding that Y is to exercise the power for X's benefit.5
To be sure, there are limits to the analogy, because the Constitution is also unlike
a power of attorney. Private clients are different from the people of the United
States as a whole, the government is a more complex beast than any private attorney, and the relationship between the people and the government is different
from that between an individual and his or her attorney in any number of ways.6
But all analogies have limits, and discovering what is illuminating about a good

2.

GARY LAWSON

& GUY

SEIDMAN,

"A

GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY": UNDERSTANDING

THE

FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION (2017).

3. See id. at 7 (crediting Natelson). In all, the book cites seven different published works by
Natelson, one of which is co-written with Lawson and Seidman. They are: Gary Lawson, Guy I.
Seidman & Robert G. Natelson, The Fiduciary Foundations of Federal Equal Protection, 94 B.U. L.
REV. 415 (2014) [hereinafter Lawson, Seidman & Natelson, Fiduciary Foundations]; Robert G.
Natelson, The Legal Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in GARY LAWSON, GEOFFREY P.
MILLER, ROBERT G. NATELSON & GUY I. SEIDMAN, THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER

CLAUSE (2010); Robert G. Natelson, The Framing andAdoption of the Necessary and Proper Clause, in
LAWSON ET AL., supra; Robert G. Natelson, Judicial Review of Special Interest Spending: The General
Welfare Clause and the Fiduciary Law of the Founders, 11 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 239 (2007) [hereinafter
Natelson, Judicial Review of Special Interest Spending]; Robert G. Natelson, The Agency Law Origins
of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 55 CASE WESTERN L. REV. 243, 247-76 (2004); Robert G.
Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077 (2004); and Robert G. Natelson,
The Government as Fiduciary: A Practical Demonstration from the Reign of Trajan, 35 U. RICHMOND
L. REV. 191 (2001).
4. See, e.g., LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 2, at 11.
5. Thirty years ago, Attorney General Edwin Meese invoked something like this idea in his
Guidelines on Constitutional Interpretation, directing government litigators to see the people as their
client and the Constitution as that client's instructions. See OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, GUIDELINES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION (1988). Note that in that application the analogy

may have served to empower government officials at least as much as to restrain them: We The People
are a client that furnishes its lawyers with maximum autonomy, because the client never shows up to tell
the lawyers how to do their jobs.
6. Lawson and Seidman acknowledge as much. See, e.g., LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supranote 2, at 56.
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analogy requires the willingness to focus on instructive similarities rather than
trashing the analysis simply because the two compared objects are not the same
in every respect. So, to glide past some complications for the moment, the
Constitution formally delegates powers belonging initially to one entity (the
People) to another entity (the government), and the government is supposed to
exercise its delegated powers not for its own benefit but for the benefit of the
People it serves. The government is, in that respect, the legal agent of the people,
and the Constitution is its warrant for acting in their name. So there is something
to the metaphor of the Constitution as a power of attorney.
Something-but how much? Recall here the South Asian fable of the blind
men and the elephant. 7 In the fable, several blind men set out to discover by direct
observation what an elephant is. One feels the elephant's trunk and determines
that the elephant is like a snake. Another bumps against the elephant's side and
concludes that the elephant is like a wall. A third feels the elephant's leg and
announces that the elephant is like a tree. And so on. The blind men then fall to
fighting about their disagreement, a disagreement in which "each was partly in
the right, and all were in the wrong." The point of the fable, of course, is that a
thing can resemble some other thing in one of its aspects while still being so different from the resembled thing that nothing much flows from the comparison.
Yes, the elephant is a little like a tree. But it is not a good idea to try to climb the
elephant, or prune it, or picnic in its shade.

I.

THE CLAIM

The question to ask about Lawson and Seidman's book, therefore, is whether
analogizing the Constitution to a power of attorney helps us think cogently about
the Constitution. Is the Constitution enough like a power of attorney to generate
consequences for constitutional meaning and constitutional law?9 To be clear,
and as I will discuss in more depth later on, Lawson and Seidman do not assert
that their argument settles any twenty-first-century legal questions. But they do
propose to carry us some distance in that direction.
To understand the significance of the book, it is helpful to locate its argument
within a complete chain of reasoning that would move from a set of initial premises to a set of judicially actionable conclusions. Such a chain of reasoning could
be rendered in five parts. This rendering is my reconstruction rather than the
authors' explicit organization of their ideas. I break the chain of reasoning into
these five parts in order to distinguish carefully between propositions that A

7. My favorite version is a doggerel retelling by John Godfrey Saxe. The Blind Men and the
Elephant, in THE POEMS OF JOHN GODFREY SAXE 259 (1872).
8. Id. at 260.
9. Lawson and Seidman seem to agree that the question should be posed this way, and they answer it
in those terms: "The Constitution is sufficiently like a power of attorney in enough important respects to
make the interpretative rules for that kind of instrument prime candidates for interpretative rules for
understanding the Constitution. That is the only substantive proposition to which all of the machinery in
our book thus far is addressed." LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supranote 2, at 54-55.
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Great Power of Attorney claims to establish and propositions that it officially
acknowledges it does not establish. As organized for that purpose, the five propositions are as follows:
(1) Americans of the Founding generation understood the Constitution as a fiduciary instrument.
(2) More specifically, the Constitution strongly resembles an eighteenth-century power of attorney.
(3) The original meaning of the Constitution is, to a considerable extent, a
function of what the Constitution's text would mean if interpreted with
the interpretive principles that eighteenth-century Americans would have
used when interpreting powers of attorney. Those principles prominently
include the idea that powers conveyed are to be construed strictly.
(4) The meaning of the Constitution when it was adopted is also its meaning
today.
(5) Courts deciding constitutional cases should construe the powers of the
federal government strictly.
The authors repeatedly disclaim having demonstrated proposition (5)."o
Constitutional law as enforced by courts, they explain, is not a pure function of
constitutional meaning. It is a more complex function of constitutional meaning
and considerations related to the practicalities of the social world and the institutional role of courts. According to Lawson and Seidman, their book is only about
what the Constitution means, not what anyone is obligated to do in light of that
meaning."
The authors fully endorse the first four propositions. But, as they explain, the
book only argues propositions (2) and (3). For proposition (1), they rely on prior
work by Natelson. 12 Proposition (4) sounds in originalism, and a great deal has
been written on the question elsewhere, and the authors do not reargue the case in
this book. Instead, the ambition of A Great Power of Attorney is to build on
Natelson by arguing the second and third propositions. To execute that ambition
successfully would be to establish something important about the original meaning of the Constitution-and therefore, in the authors' view, something important
about the meaning of the Constitution, period.
I am not persuaded by all of the book's claims about what the Constitution
would mean if it were interpreted with the principles that eighteenth-century
Americans would have used to interpret powers of attorney.13 But my focus is on

10. See, e.g., id. at 5,61, 172.
11. See, e.g., id. at 5.
12. See, e.g., id. at 7 (crediting Natelson).
13. My reservations on this score operate on two levels. First, I am not confident that the rules of
interpretation for powers of attorney were sufficiently settled, uniform, and discriminating to generate
any reliable set of meanings when applied to the Constitution, whether through a rule of strict
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a prior part of the thought process. Fundamentally, I do not think the book succeeds in showing that the Constitution's original meaning was substantially
shaped by the power-of-attorney idea. The evidence proffered is too weak to support the claim that Americans of the Founding generation-whether real ones or
hypothesized reasonable ones-recognized the Constitution as a legal instrument
to be interpreted like a power of attorney. If the evidence cannot support that
claim, the rest of the project never gets off the ground.
My contention is not merely that the Constitution is not a power of attorney. If
I were saying only that, I would not be grappling with the best version of
Lawson's and Seidman's argument. They recognize that a claim that the
Constitution should be interpreted like a power of attorney because it is a power
of attorney could be picked apart. As they say themselves, the Constitution differs
from a power of attorney in several important respects.14 So instead, Lawson and
Seidman defend the more moderate claim that "the comparison between the
Constitution and a power of attorney works at some level."" Their arguments
about constitutional meaning are, officially, conditional and partial: if or to the
extent that the Constitution should be interpreted as a power of attorney, the
Constitution means such-and-such.16
For the exercise to be valuable, though, the relevant extent must be pretty considerable. If the Constitution is like a power of attorney only to the extent that an
elephant is like a tree, then the comparison cannot generate useful conclusions
about what the Constitution means. After all, the elephant is a little like a tree.
But it does not follow that in figuring out how to interact with elephants, it is sensible to proceed by thinking about how one interacts with trees. Not even a
little. 1 7

construction or otherwise. I do not know enough about eighteenth-century American agency law to be
certain that the claim is wrong, but I also do not think its correctness has been sufficiently demonstrated.
Second, some of the particular ways that the authors apply the idea that powers conveyed are to be
construed strictly may be too quick. For example, the authors contend that Congress does not exercise a
regulatory power given to it by telling executive agents to regulate in the relevant area, "just as a steward
given authority to manage a farm would not exercise that management power by turning the job over to
a subordinate." LAwsoN & SEIDMAN, supra note 2, at 126. I am not so sure. I would guess that many
stewards given authority to manage fanms routinely direct subordinates to conduct parts of the job, or
maybe even the entire job while the steward is on vacation, without offending the farm owner's sense of
his or her arrangement with the steward. It would probably depend on the particulars of the arrangement
and the expectations of the specific parties. I similarly think that whether Congress can be said to
exercise its regulatory power when it delegates some regulatory powers to executive agencies is a
complicated question that depends on more variables than can be captured by a general conceptual claim
about what it means to exercise a power.
14. See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 2, at 54, 56.
15. Id. at 8.
16. Id. at 6.
17. To be sure, some of the ways in which one would sensibly behave toward elephants converge
with the ways in which one would sensibly behave toward trees. For example, I would not try to lift
either thing with my bodily strength alone. Nor would I expect either an elephant or a tree to help me
wash the dishes after dinner. But in neither case is analogizing the elephant to the tree a useful step in
my process of reasoning about the elephant. I know what I need to know about the elephant by direct
observation, without the need for the analogy.
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It is accordingly necessary to ask about the strength of the historical claim that
underlies the book's project. To what extent, at the time of the Founding, did the
drafters or the ratifying public see the Constitution as analogous to a power of attomey? To what extent did the drafters or the ratifying public think that a known
set of interpretive tools reliably used in the interpretation of powers of attorney
would also be used to interpret the Constitution? How broadly did members of
the ratifying public hold such views, and how much weight did they think that
view of the Constitution had relative to other possible ideas about how the
Constitution should be interpreted? Or, if one prefers to ask the question in a
more abstract way,18 what would the view of a hypothetical reasonable American
in the 1780s have been on these matters?
In my own view, as distinct from Lawson's and Seidman's, nothing about modem constitutional meaning-let alone modem constitutional law-necessarily
follows from the answers to those questions. That is because I have significant disagreements with Lawson and Seidman about, among other things, the nature of
meaning. In my view, when one discovers something about the Constitution's
meaning in 1787, one discovers something about its meaning then, not its meaning
now. And for reasons that I have explained elsewhere, I am pretty certain that the
Constitution's meaning (like that of many other long-lived documents) changes
over time.1 9 All meaning is meaning to some audience and under particular circumstances, so meanings often change when audiences and circumstances do.
What the Constitution meant to the ratifying public in 1787 is, accordingly, not
what the Constitution means in se but rather what the Constitution meant to one
particular (constructively imagined) audience.
But just as Lawson and Seidman do not purport to vindicate their theory of
meaning or their version of originalism in this book, I do not come to criticize
their project by contesting their claim that the Constitution means now what it
meant in the eighteenth century. Instead, I mean to bracket those disagreements
to the greatest extent possible and then, trying to take the book on its own terms,
to investigate its claims about constitutional meaning at the Founding. If the
Founders thought that the Constitution should be interpreted like a power of attorney in the way that Lawson and Seidman describe, then the significance of that

18. As Lawson and Seidman would. A Great Power of Attorney does not spend much time
articulating its approach to identifying original meanings, but I assume the authors' approach to be
largely consonant with the one they articulated in Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalismas a Legal
Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47 (2006) (describing We the People as a hypothesized entity from
whose perspective the Constitution is written).
19. See, e.g., Richard Primus, The Constitutional Constant, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1691 (2017)
(describing the dynamic by which the meaning that the Constitution holds for Americans changes over
time as American ideals and values change, such that the Constitution always reflects Americans' values
and ideals); Richard Primus, Constitutional Expectations, 109 MICH. L. REV. 91, 98-108 (2010)
(describing the process of change). For one leading statement of a contrary position, see Lawrence B.
Solum, The FixationThesis: The Role ofHistoricalFactin ConstitutionalMeaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1 (2015) (arguing that the meaning of constitutional text is fixed at the moment of enactment and
does not subsequently change).
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fact for modem law depends on the quality of the next steps in the thought process, prominently including whether and how original meanings are binding later
on. If the Founders thought about the Constitution in the way the book describes,
that fact might be worth communicating even if original meanings are not binding
in later constitutional law. Historical knowledge can be valuable even when it
does not generate modem law. But if the Founders did not think of the
Constitution as a document to be interpreted as if it were a power of attomey-or,
if you prefer, if the hypothetical reasonable Founder would not have thought that
way-then there is no need to take the argument any further.
One additional thought about the book's orientation toward historical evidence
is perhaps necessary here. Much of the time, A GreatPower ofAttorney seems to
treat original constitutional meaning as something that one could identify by
understanding (and where necessary abstracting from) the ideas that reasonable
Americans had about constitutional meaning during the 1780s. That is a mainstream view and, I think, a sensible one. On that view, whether the Constitution's
original meaning was shaped by an interpretive prism calling for the document to
be read like a power of attorney is a question about whether and to what extent
reasonable people at the Founding would have interpreted the Constitution in that
way. Answering that question would call for (but perhaps not be limited to) an
investigation into whether and to what extent Founding-Era Americans in fact
entertained that set of views about interpreting the Constitution. Sometimes, however, Lawson and Seidman write as if their claim about original constitutional
meaning is independent of the ideas that Americans held about the Constitution
during the 1780s. When they write in this second way, Lawson and Seidman
seem to be saying that the best way to understand the Constitution's nature in its
original context is as a power of attorney, whether or not any actual members of
the Founding generation had that conception.2 0
I understand how the first of these two approaches can generate conclusions
about the Constitution's original meaning. To the extent that reasonable
Americans in the 1780s thought that the Constitution should be interpreted like a

20. For example, in explaining their claim that the original meaning of the Constitution is its
meaning if understood as a power of attorney rather than as if understood as a trust, Lawson and
Seidman concede that many more eighteenth-century Americans described the Constitution as a trust
than as a power of attorney but then say this: "[W]e think the power of attorney better captures the
actual form, structure, and operation of the Constitution than does the trust, and we accordingly are
persuaded that reasonable eighteenth-century observers who considered both analogies carefully and
systematically (of which we do not have any good evidence of concrete eighteenth-century observers
actually doing) would agree that the power of attorney better captures the ideas sought to be conveyed
by the Constitution than does the trust analogy." LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 2, at 62. This seems
to say that (1) by and large, eighteenth-century Americans did not consciously think about the
Constitution in the way that Lawson and Seidman think best, but (2) if they had focused on the
question and considered it in a careful and reasonable way, they would have concluded that Lawson
and Seidman are right. This is a remarkably ahistorical approach to the investigation of original
constitutional meanings, because it sees ideas actually held at the moment of origin as judgments that
later observers can dismiss as incorrect understandings of the Constitution rather than as parts of the
data from which original meanings must be constructed.
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power of attorney, identifying the Constitution's meaning in the 1780s calls for
reading it in that way. (Much as the prevailing view among Americans in the
1780s that the Constitution should be interpreted as if it were written in English is
a good reason for thinking that determining its original meaning calls for reading
it as if it were written in English.) The second approach, however, does not seem
conceptually capable of identifying original constitutional meanings. After all,
the meaning of a text to a given audience at a given time must be a meaning discernable with an interpretive method known to that audience at that time. It is one
thing to argue, as many originalists do, that the original meaning of "equal protection" or "free speech" can apply today in ways that most Americans would not
have foreseen in 1868 or 1791;21 it is quite another to argue that discerning the
original meaning of a text can require an approach to interpretation not in use at
the time the text was written. If members of the Founding generation did not
interpret the Constitution as if it were a power of attorney, then it makes little
sense to say that the Constitution's original meaning is the meaning it would have
if the document were read as if it were a power of attorney. A text cannot have
communicative content that would be decodable only with a technology not
available to anyone in its audience. Or, more prosaically: If it was not read that
way, it did not mean what it would mean if it were read that way. And if no actual
Founders read it that way, a hypothesized reasonable Founder would not read it
that way either.
To me, that second approach seems less like identifying the Constitution's
original meaning than like substituting one's own views for those of the
Founders. Instead of asking "What did people think then?" or "What would a
hypothesized reasonable person of that time have thought?", the second approach
asks something like "Regardless of what interpretive conclusions people in
1787-1788 actually reached, what conclusions do I reach about the meaning of
the Constitution, if I work from the materials that were known in 1787-1788?"
But nobody owns the term "original meaning," and Lawson and Seidman are free
to answer whatever question they wish. Moreover, even given the significant
differences between these two conceptions of original meaning, an argument
about original meanings on either conception would have to take account of facts
about the world from which the Constitution emerged. So I now turn to evidence
about those facts.
II.

THE EVIDENCE

Not to hide the ball: I do not think the book succeeds in showing that the
Founders believed the Constitution would or should be interpreted like a privatelaw power of attorney in any way sufficient to generate conclusions about

21. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 427, 432-36 (2007) (articulating the distinction between original meanings and original
expected applications); Christopher R. Green, Originalism and the Sense-Reference Distinction, 50 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 555 (2005).
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constitutional meaning in 1788, let alone today. The basic reason is that little evidence for the proposition is presented. The general background evidence requires
generous inferential leaps, and the direct evidence from writings and speeches of
Americans at the Founding rests heavily on a single speech. Worse, that single
speech might suggest the opposite of what the book uses it to show. And the historical record is strikingly bereft of supporting evidence in places where such evidence should be thick on the ground. For example, there is no indication that
opponents of extensive federal power used the power-of-attomey frame to make
their arguments in the first years after the Constitution was adopted. If the idea
that the Constitution should be interpreted with the restrictive tools applicable to
powers of attorney was mainstream in 1788, it is hard to explain why nobody
arguing for restrictive interpretation of federal power in the years immediately
following spoke up to remind people of that point.
A. OfNatelson, and Beyond
It is easy to find examples of Founding-Era Americans describing government
with words or ideas that crop up in the law of agency. Then as now, people might
describe government officials as executing a public trust, or as the agents of their
constituents, and so forth. Nothing about this phenomenon is particular to the
American Founding. It is just as easy to find people speaking this way about government on other continents and in other centuries. And whether in 1780s
America or elsewhere, the people who use this language might not be saying that
government should proceed on the basis of the technical specifics of agency law,
just as a person who says "All men are brothers" is probably not saying that all
dealings among men are to be governed by the law of family relationships.
Locke, for example, used the language of "trust" when describing the basis of
government, and the leading modem scholars of Locke's political thought have
taken the view (rightly, I think) that Locke was using the idea metaphorically, to
make some general points at a high level of abstraction. 22 Those general points
included the ideas that government officials have an obligation to serve the public
rather than simply themselves, that the claim of legitimate governmental authority rests on a moral framework rather than on the mere fact of power, and that
government officials must as a practical matter have some discretion in their exercise of power rather than being minutely regulated and supervised by the people
they govern. 23 But it did not follow, for Locke, that any technical interpretive

22. See, e.g., John Dunn, The Concept of "Trust" in the Politics of John Locke, in PHILOSOPHY IN
296 (Richard Rorty, J.B. Schneewind & Quentin Skinner eds., 1984); JOHN LOCKE: Two
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 114-15 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
23. John Dunn put the point this way: "The legal concept of trust captures nicely three features on
which Locke is anxious to insist: the clarity of a ruler's responsibility to serve the public good, the
existence of a structure of rights external to the practical relation of ruling on which a sovereign's claim
to authority must depend, and the inescapable asymmetry of power between ruler and ruled which
precludes the latter from exercising direct and continuing control over the former." Dunn, supra note 21,
at 296. At the same time, Dunn unhesitatingly concludes that "The metaphor of a legal trust .. . carries
little or no distinctive weight in [Locke's] argument." Id. In other words, Locke did not argue that the
HISTORY
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rules applicable to legal 24 things called "trusts" were therefore also applicable to
government. That is, Locke was using the trust idea as an illustrative metaphor,
not as a source of transposable rules.25 It is perfectly plausible to think that
Americans who used fiduciary language were speaking in the same sorts of general or metaphorical ways.26 So supporting the claim that Americans understood
the Constitution as a legal instrument that should be interpreted like a power of attomey, or any other instrument of agency law, requires more than pointing to
examples of Americans speaking of trusts, agents, or powers of attorney when
talking about the Constitution. It requires evidence that the agency language used
was meant to carry a specific set of technical implications for how the
Constitution should be interpreted.
Indeed, it would require lots of such evidence-enough to displace a fair
amount of existing work on the subject. Many respected scholars-some of them
originalists, some of them not-have concluded that there was no generally
shared view at the time of the Founding about the appropriate rules for interpreting the Constitution. 2 7 That lack of agreement about interpretive rules, this prior
scholarship explains, stemmed partly from the fact that the Constitution was a

&

three important features of government named above should be understood to be features of government
because government is a trust; he simply used the idea of a trust as a way of communicating those ideas
about government.
24. "Legal" is here used in an imprecise (or anachronistic) sense. Technically, trusts were creatures
of Chancery and therefore equitable rather than legal entities.
25. See Dunn, supra note 21; see also Laslett, supra note 21, at 115 ("Locke did not intend to go
further in his references to trust than to make suggestive use of legal language. . . . The concept is
obviously intended to make it clear that all actions of governors are limited to the end of government,
which is the good of the governed. . . .").
26. As Lawson and Seidman acknowledge. See, e.g., LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 2, at 3 (raising
the possibility that James Iredell spoke metaphorically when describing the Constitution as a power of
attorney).
27. See, e.g., JONATHAN GIENAPP, THE SECOND CREATION: FIXING THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION IN
THE FOUNDING ERA 116-23 (2018) (showing that at and near the time of ratification, there was no
consensus on the appropriate methods for interpreting the Constitution or otherwise putting it into
practice); Kurt T. Lash, Originalism All the Way Down?, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 149, 154 (2015)
(reviewing JOHN 0. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION
(2013)) (noting Founding-Era dissensus on the question of how the Constitution should be interpreted);
Lash, supra, at 161 (arguing that the Constitution was a new kind of document, to which pre-existing
methods of interpretation were inapplicable); JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 353-56 (2011)
(canvassing the topic of Founding-Era disagreement over what sort of document the Constitution was
and how it was to be interpreted); Saul Cornell, The People's Constitution vs. The Lawyers'
Constitution: Popular Constitutionalism and the Original Debate over Originalism, 23 YALE J.L.
HUMAN. 295, 296 (2011) ("Americans were just as deeply divided over questions of constitutional
methodology then as they are now."); Larry Kramer, Two (More) Problems with Originalism, 31 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 907, 912 (2008) ("[T]here was no more agreement about what the 'correct' way to
interpret the Constitution was or should be in the early years of the Republic than there is today.");
Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 555-56 (2003)
(noting a variety of views among the Founders about whether the Constitution should be interpreted
using the rules applicable to other legal instruments and, if so, which ones); H. Jefferson Powell, The
Original Understanding of Original Intent, 91 HARV. L. REV. 885, 912-13 (1985) (noting that at the
time of ratification there were "sharp disagreements over which interpretive approach was acceptable"
and even over whether recourse to traditional methods of legal interpretation was acceptable at all).
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new sort of legal instrument, one for which analogies to older sorts of legal instruments were at best partial and controversial.28 Just as the elephant is neither tree
nor snake nor wall, the Constitution was not reducible to any particular thing that
American lawyers had worked with before.
That many prior scholars from differing ideological perspectives have come to
this conclusion does not mean that new scholarship cannot prove things otherwise. But it would take persuasive evidence to get the job done. For their part,
Lawson and Seidman do not claim to have marshaled the evidence necessary to
show that Americans generally understood the Constitution as a fiduciary instrument that should be interpreted accordingly. Instead, they rest on Natelson, who
has argued that claim at length. The present book is in part a hymn in praise of
Natelson's efforts, which Lawson and Seidman take to be transformative.
The Natelson account, as drawn upon by Lawson and Seidman, goes like this:
In the eighteenth century, American courts had specific, reliable, and well-settled
rules for interpreting fiduciary instruments.2 9 Trusts were interpreted in a certain
way, and corporate charters were interpreted in a certain way, and powers of attorney were interpreted in a certain way, and so on. The Constitution was drafted
by people well-versed in the standardized interpretive principles of fiduciary
law,30 and they knowingly drafted a document that conformed to the specifications of a fiduciary instrument. What's more, the Constitution's nature as a fiduciary instrument was well-understood not just by its drafters, and not just by judges
and lawyers, but by the public broadly. In the eighteenth century, the argument
runs, American laypeople had a great deal of personal experience with fiduciary
law, and they were well-versed in its rules of interpretation.31 So when the people
ratified the Constitution, they understood themselves to be adopting an instrument
that would be interpreted using well-settled rules from the law of agency.
Taking Natelson's argument as a given, Lawson and Seidman take the further
step of arguing that there is a certain kind of fiduciary instrument that the
Constitution most resembles: a power of attorney. But they do not make that
claim by arguing that people at the Founding spoke about the Constitution as a
power of attorney more than they spoke about it using other sorts of terms known
to agency law.32 Instead, they proceed mostly by means of a substantive comparison. All things considered, they argue, the Constitution has more in common

28. See, e.g., GIENAPP, supra note 26; LASH, supra note 26, at 161; BALKIN, supra note 26, at 35356; NELSON, supra note 26, at 555-56.
29. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 2, at 17.
30. Id. at 30.
31. Id. at 29.
32. Natelson, for his part, argues that the most common agency language that the Founders used
when discussing the Constitution was not that of powers of attorney but that of public trust. See
Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, supra note 3, at 1086-87. It may be worth noting here
that the trust metaphor differs from Lawson's and Seidman's power-of-attorney metaphor-among
other ways-by suggesting that government is vested with considerable discretion. See Dunn, supra
note 21, at 296-97 (noting this feature of the trust metaphor and its importance in Locke's theory of
government).
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with an eighteenth-century power of attorney than with other sorts of legal
instruments.
One key payoff to this argument, for Lawson and Seidman, is that according to
the assertedly standard interpretive rules in effect in the eighteenth century,
powers of attorney were to be construed strictly. A constituted attorney, the argument runs, would under eighteenth-century agency law be entitled to exercise
only the powers specifically granted in the fiduciary instrument. So if the
Constitution should be interpreted like an eighteenth-century power of attorney,
it authorizes the federal government to do considerably less than would be the
case if the Constitution were interpreted in some other way-even if that other
way still regarded the Constitution as a fiduciary instrument but not as a power of
attorney in particular. After all, not all fiduciary instruments are equally restrictive. Corporate charters are fiduciary instruments, but they are interpreted as creating inherent or implicit powers as well as expressly conveyed ones.33 Trusts are
fiduciary instruments, but one of their essential aspects is the vesting of discretion
in the trustee. So if the Constitution should be interpreted as an eighteenthcentury fiduciary instrument, it matters whether the instrument as which it is
interpreted is a power of attorney, a corporate charter, a trust, or something else.
B. BackgroundInferences
There are parts of Natelson's account that I am not qualified to assess. For
example, I do not know enough about eighteenth-century agency law practice to
be able to evaluate with confidence the claim that the interpretive conventions applicable to trusts, to corporate charters, and to powers of attorney were wellsettled throughout British North America. Was it indeed the case, in a world without institutional legal training or a system for collecting and distributing the decisions of courts, that a geographically dispersed population shared a single set of
technical understandings on these matters?34 Even if so, was it really the case that
laypeople and not just experts knew those rules? One might worry that the
account reflects a Tower of Babel fantasy,35 in which we imagine that at some
earlier and purer time we were all of one speech. But that worry is merely a reason for skepticism. It does not disprove Natelson's claim, nor does it exempt anyone from confronting Natelson's evidence with an open mind.
The trouble is that the evidence is, in important places, thin. Here, for example,
is the most developed version36 of Natelson's argument that American laypeople
knew the rules of interpretation in fiduciary law:

33. See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 2, at 68 (acknowledging this distinction).
34. Natelson does not produce any ground-level studies of agency-law practice.
35. I owe this phrase to Don Herzog.
36. It is, at any rate, the most developed version offered in any of the seven works by Natelson cited
in A Great Power of Attorney. Having not read all of Natelson's work, I might be missing a more
developed account elsewhere. In the seven works I consulted, Natelson does not refer to such a more
developed account in some other piece of writing.
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Members of the founding generation who were neither lawyers nor businessmen often gained personal knowledge of the relevant standards by serving as
fiduciaries themselves. The shorter life expectancy of the time left far more
decedents' and orphans' estates to administer per capita, creating a need for
guardians, executors, administrators, and trustees. Affective relationships
among family members were much stronger in the eighteenth century than in
periods immediately prior, and such obligations were honored accordingly.
And general knowledge of the law was more widely spread among the public
than it is today, as one can perceive when one reads the public debates, so often
carried on in explicitly legal terms.3 7
Those propositions are rather general, and it is not clear that they can support
the conclusion they are supposed to establish. To begin at the beginning:
Natelson produces no actual statistics about, or even estimates of, the number or
proportion of Americans who served as fiduciaries. And there are reasons visible
even on the same page of Natelson's writing for suspecting that the practice could
not have been terribly widespread. For example, Natelson reports that in
Virginia, "All fiduciaries seem to have posted hefty bonds (commonly between
100 and 1000 pounds)." 3 8 Wouldn't a requirement to post that kind of bond
sharply limit the proportion of Virginians who could have the experience of serving as fiduciaries? Not every eighteenth-century Virginian had that kind of money
lying around.
The next step in the argument-that shorter life expectancy would mean more
decedents per capita-seems right. But it requires a further inference to think that
there would have been a substantially higher per capita number of decedents' and
orphans' estates. (Was it not common for people-especially people who died
early in life-to die without property, or to die intestate, or both? Much of the
shorter life expectancy of that time was due to high rates of infant mortality, and
dying infants rarely leave behind property in need of administration.3 9 ) The proposition that "relationships among family members were much stronger in the
eighteenth century than in periods immediately prior" seems a bit broad,4 0 and
even if true in the aggregate, it might have no bearing on whether large numbers
of Americans served as fiduciaries. Many types of family affection have little to
do with the implementation of technical legal duties. And supposing even that

Natelson, Judicial Review of Special Interest Spending, supra note 3, at 247-48.
Id.at248n.33.
Natelson's statistics about life expectancy are about life expectancy at birth. See id. at 247 n.32.
Id. at 248. Natelson's citation for this sentence is of Lawrence Stone's magnum opus LAWRENCE
STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN- ENGLAND, 1500-1800 (1977). To prevent readers from
judging Natelson with unjustified harshness, it bears mention that Stone's treatise does, here and there,
discuss America as well as England. But (and with the due caveat that I have not read Stone's entire
tome), I am not aware that Stone at any point says that the family's movement toward being more of an
affective institution in the eighteenth century had any particular impact on individuals' tendencies to
serve as fiduciaries for their family members. Stone is cited simply as "noting that a general theme of his
extensive study was the great warming of intra-family sentiment from the sixteenth to eighteenth
centuries." Natelson, JudicialReview of Special Interest Spending, supra note 3, at 248 n.34.
37.
38.
39.
40.
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many ordinary Americans served as fiduciaries and did so conscientiously, it
would still not follow that those Americans knew the technical rules by which fiduciary instruments were interpreted by courts. If most fiduciaries did their jobs
in good faith and competently, there would be little need to get courts involved or
otherwise to worry about the technical rules of interpretation.41
Finally, Natelson's example of a source that shows that legal knowledge was
widespread among the public-a 1787 essay about the proposed Constitution by
an author using the pseudonym Timoleon 42-does not seem like good support for
that claim. Timoleon's essay does suggest legal sophistication. But why is that
sophistication evidence of widespread legal knowledge? Timoleon was probably
James Tilton, a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania who served in both
the Delaware Legislature and the Continental Congress.4 3 Needless to say, pointing to a sophisticated analysis by such a person does nothing to advance the claim
that ordinary Americans had similar levels of legal sophistication.4 4
None of these gaps in Natelson's argument proves that his claim is false.
Maybe eighteenth-century Americans, laypeople and lawyers alike, really did
share a set of technical understandings about the interpretation of fiduciary instruments. Maybe better evidence could be produced. But maybe not. And although
the shortcomings of the evidence offered does not falsify the claim, they do suggest that the historical record is being read in a light rather favorable to the case
being prosecuted. So to the extent that A Great Power of Attorney rests on
Natelson's historical claims-and that extent is considerable-the project rests
on uncertain foundations.
The book's refinement of Natelson's thesis, by which the Constitution is said
to resemble not just any fiduciary instrument but a power of attorney in particular,
relies on some uncertain inferences of its own. For example, the book contends
that the Constitution looks like an eighteenth-century power of attorney because
a typical power of attorney would have "a preamble setting forth the reasons for

41. Modem Americans have experience in relationships and transactions governed by contracts. But
not many non-lawyers know the principle of contra preferentum or the parol evidence rule. And the idea
that an employer who has contracted to employ a person at forty thousand dollars a year for five years
commits no breach when firing the employee after three years is-in my limited experience-one that
laypeople tend to dismiss as obviously wrong, even when articulated by a law professor.
42. Natelson, Judicial Review of Special Interest Spending, supra note 3, at 248 n.36 (citing
TIMOLEON (1787), reprintedin 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
534, 535 (John P. Kaminsky & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981) [hereinafter DHRC]).
43. Tilton used the Timoleon pseudonym when publishing other work the following year. See JAMES
BARNWELL, READING NOTES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, at xi (1887); 7
CHARLES EVANS, AMERICAN BIBLIOGRAPHY (1912); Book Note, 46 Miss. VALLEY HIST. REV. 167
(1959) (reviewing TIMOLEON's BIOGRAPHICAL HISTORY OF DIONYsIUs, TYRANT OF DELAWARE (John A.
Munroe ed., 1958)); William Henry Williams, Delaware and Ratificationa ParadoxExamined, 6 DEL.
LAW. 8 (1987). For that reason, and because the November 1787 essay Natelson cites articulates
antifederalist views consistent with Tilton's own, he seems the likely author.
44. Natelson says that the Timoleon source is merely one of many that could be adduced for the
purpose. But the fact that the one source adduced does not support the argument raises questions about
how persuasive the other promised sources would be. In the end, of course, the claim that other sources
could demonstrate the point cannot be evaluated until those other sources are adduced.
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and purposes of the document, a clause constituting and ordering the agent, a
description of the agent's principal powers, and (where appropriate) an incidental
powers clause." 45 But to their credit, the authors acknowledge that they did not
examine a large enough sample of American powers of attorney to know how
widely powers of attorney conformed to that particular template.46 Moreover, as
the authors also acknowledge, those particular features of the Constitution were
common in other sorts of eighteenth-century legal instruments besides powers of
attorney. Indeed, they were common in corporate charters-and as Lawson and
Seidman recognize, treating the Constitution as a corporate charter would bring
into play a more generous approach to construing the government's powers.47
What's more, those three features-a preamble, a description of principal powers,
and an incidental powers clause-do not come close to a full description of the
Constitution. If one focused on other aspects of the Constitution at least as important as those three-say, its division of the power-exercising entity into three
branches, or its specification of a unique process for changing its own contentthe analogy with a power of attorney would not come to mind.
Lawson and Seidman recognize that the analogy between the Constitution and
powers of attorney is imperfect. They contend, however, that the Constitution is
in substance more analogous to a power of attorney than to any other sort of legal
instrument. 4 8 I am not sure that is right. 4 9 But even if it were, it would be a fallacy
to insist that the Constitution should be interpreted as if it were some other sort of
legal instrument to which it is analogous, rather than admitting the possibility that
Constitution should be interpreted in the specific and distinctive way appropriate
for the specific and distinctive kind of law that it is. As Bishop Butler taught, every thing is what it is, and not some other thing.
C. Lonely James Iredell
These reservations would matter a lot less if Natelson or Lawson and
Seidman produced direct evidence that many Americans in 1787-1788
believed that the Constitution should be interpreted with restrictive rules of
interpretation appropriate for interpreting powers of attorney. And they do
have an example of a prominent Founder speaking about the Constitution that
way. In a speech given in July 1788, James Iredell described the Constitution
as "a great power of attorney," conferring specific powers on the government

45. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supranote 2, at 23.

46. Id. at 21
47. Id. at 68. For an important development of the corporate-charter alternative, see John Mikhail, Is
the Constitution a Power ofAttorney or a Corporate Charter?, 17 Geo. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 407 (2019)
48. Well, they almost argue that. They seem to concede that the analogy to a corporate charter works
about as well. See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 2, at 64-68. And the authors recognize that different
implications for federal power would follow from approaching the Constitution in one of those two
ways rather than the other. Id. at 68. But for whatever reason, this concession does not deflect the authors
from their central argument.
49. As noted just above, Lawson and Seidman concede that a corporate charter analogy works about
as well. A reasonable argument could be made that the analogy with a trust is also comparably good.
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as the agent of the people. 0 Natelson produces this line from Iredell frequently," and Lawson and Seidman use the image as the title of their book.
There is no question that Iredell, in this 1788 speech, offered a picture of the
Constitution as just the thing that Lawson and Seidman say it should be compared
to: a power of attorney. What's more, Iredell in this passage characterized the
Constitution as a power of attorney precisely in order to make the point that
Lawson and Seidman identify as the most important implication of recognizing
the Constitution as a power of attorney: that the powers it confers are to be strictly
construed. In the relevant speech, Iredell was arguing that the Constitution did
not need a Bill of Rights because the enumeration of Congress's powers, strictly
construed, would provide all the protection necessary for individual rights. To
support the claim that the enumerated powers would be strictly construed, Iredell
analogized the Constitution to a power of attorney. Given how well the example
fits the thesis, it is no wonder that Iredell's speech is, for Lawson and Seidman as
well as for Natelson, Exhibit A.
The problem is that there is no Exhibit B. Unless I have missed something, this
Iredell speech is the only source that Natelson points to in which anyone in 17871788 expressly analogized the Constitution to a power of attorney, whether for interpretive purposes or otherwise. If I missed another example in Natelson's work,
Lawson and Seidman missed it also: they forthrightly acknowledge that as far as
they know, "Iredell is the only person from the founding era and before to use the
terminology of a power of attorney" in connection with the Constitution.5 2
This is not a small problem. During the ratification process, Americans produced enormous amounts of text about the Constitution, pro and con. Even many
ideas about the Constitution that were squarely rejected were articulated dozens
of times. To be sure, the quantum of evidence required to make a plausible case
that people at a certain time and place thought about something in a certain way
is partly a matter of judgment, and as such it is one about which informed analysts
can reasonably disagree. I know no rule by which a historian would need to produce a hundred rather than fifty or twenty instances of an idea's being articulated
during the 1780s in order to sustain a claim about constitutional interpretation at
that time. But establishing such a claim must require considerably more than a
single example.
To be clear, the fact that neither Natelson nor Lawson and Seidman have any
other examples does not prove that Americans did not think of the Constitution as
a power of attorney in 1788. Maybe the ratifying public did think that way and
simply left no evidence of the fact. Or perhaps the evidence exists and this book

50. 4

THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL

148 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES].
51. See, e.g., Natelson, The Legal Origins of the Necessary and ProperClause, supra note 3, at 55;
Natelson, The Framing and Adoption of the Necessary and Proper Clause, supra note 3, at 103;
Natelson, supranote 36, at 247; Natelson, The Agency Law Originsof the Necessary andProperClause,
supra note 3, at 305.
52. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 2, at 62.
CONSTITUTION
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for whatever reason does not happen to produce it. But the former possibility is
sheer speculation that cannot be enough to make a persuasive case about the
Constitution's original meaning, and the latter possibility is, I think, not bome out
by the facts. I do not mean that there are zero examples of anyone other than
Iredell's using that frame during the ratification debates. But the number might
not be much higher than zero, either. My own searches of the America's
Historical Newspapers database and the electronic version of the Documentary
History of the Ratification of the Constitution (DHRC) discovered one occasion
on which a delegate to the Massachusetts convention offered the analogy.53 But
that is all. Given the vast output of writing and speaking about the Constitution in
America during 1787-1788, it is just plain hard to think that an idea that may
have been argued publicly just two times anywhere on the continent was in fact a
widely shared view.54
On the contrary, the Iredell speech considered in context works at least as well
for a counter-hypothesis: that Americans widely rejected the idea that the
Constitution was a power of attorney in the way Iredell claimed. Iredell made the
speech in question at a North Carolina convention called to consider ratifying
the Constitution. His power-of-attomey argument was meant to help the delegates
see that ratification was the right decision to make. But the North Carolina convention at which Iredell was speaking voted against ratifying the Constitution.
That refusal to ratify was a repudiation of Iredell, who was the leader of North
Carolina's pro-ratification faction.
Moreover, the convention delegates overtly contradicted the specific argument
that Iredell had been making when he spoke of the Constitution as a power of attomey. Iredell was responding to the common complaint that the Constitution
contained no Bill of Rights and more specifically to the contention that North
Carolina should not ratify unless the Constitution were amended to provide one.
Arguing that North Carolina should ratify and not demand a Bill of Rights,
Iredell contended that amendments in the nature of a Bill of Rights "would not
only be incongruous, but dangerous."56 It would be incongruous because the
Constitution was a great power of attorney, so the powers of Congress would be
strictly construed, and affirmative limitations would be out of place. And it would
be dangerous because specifying rights that Congress could not abridge would
imply that Congress was not limited to the powers expressly described.5 7 In other

53. Statement of Mr. Choate at the Massachusetts convention, Jan. 25, 1788, 6 DHRC, supra note
41, at 1351.
54. The DHRC does also record one instance in which someone considered using the analogy and
thought better of it. About ten days after the analogy was offered in the Massachusetts convention, the
prominent Massachusetts lawyer William Cushing-later a Justice of the United States Supreme
Court-included the analogy between the Constitution and a power of attorney in a draft of notes for a
speech. But Cushing deleted the analogy in a subsequent draft, and the speech itself was never given.
See 6 DHRC, supra note 41, 1433 n.11.
55. 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 49, at 251.
56. Id. at 149.
57. Id.

2019]

THE ELEPHANT PROBLEM

391

words, amendments in the nature of a Bill of Rights would have the deleterious
effect, in Iredell's view, of undermining the claim that the Constitution should be
understood as a power of attorney.
This argument that a Bill of Rights would be unnecessary and maybe even
dangerous-that the enumeration of congressional powers would suffice to protect
individual liberties, and that the specification of affirmative limits on Congress
would imply that Congress could do anything not specifically prohibited-is familiar to constitutional lawyers. In its fullest form, it is associated with a speech by
James Wilson at the Pennsylvania Statehouse in September of 1787," and its most
canonical home is Hamilton's Federalist 84. Many modem commentators,
Lawson and Seidman among them, have embraced the idea as authentic
Founding-Era constitutional theory.5 9 But it was not. It was a post-hoc rationalization that some of the Constitution's supporters developed after the Convention
adjourned in an attempt to mollify members of the public who thought the
Constitution deficient for not including a Bill of Rights.60
As sometimes happens with post-hoc rationalizations, the audience saw right
through it. Any number of Americans during the ratification process denounced
the idea as specious61 and perhaps even an attempt to bamboozle the people.62
After all, the substance of the theory gives way on even a small amount of skeptical inspection. It did not take much perspicuity for Americans in 1788 to understand that a legislature with the power to tax, to raise armies, and to do various
other things could act rather oppressively if it had a mind to, even if it were limited to exercising the powers the Constitution affirmatively granted to it. 6 3 What's
more, the Philadelphia Convention's proposed document plainly included affirmative limits on Congress, so the idea that specifying such limits would be out of
place was transparently false. 64 Indeed, the argument Iredell offered was so thoroughly implausible that at many stages of the ratification process Antifederalists
practically goaded Federalists to make the argument publicly so that the
Antifederalists could denounce the Federalists as willing to say any crazy thing to

58. See 13 DHRC, supra note 41, at 337.
59. See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 2, at 46 (taking this view).
60. For one good demonstration of this point, see Mark Graber, Enumeration and Other
Constitutional Strategies for Protecting Rights: The View from 1787/91, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 357
(2007). See also LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 2, at 80 (identifying Graber as "one of the academy's
most acute legal historians").
61. See, e.g., Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Sam Adams (Oct. 27, 1787), in 13 DHRC, supra note
41, at 484-85; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 14 DHRC, supra
note 41, at 482-83.
62. Jefferson to Madison, supra note 60, at 482-83 (describing Wilson's argument as one that
"might do for the audience to which it was addressed; but it is surely a gratis dictum").
63. See, e.g., BRUTUS 1 (1787), reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra note 41, at 411, 414-16; George
Mason, Speech at the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 14, 1788), in 3 DHRC, supra note 41, at
415-16.
64. See Lee to Adams, supra note 60; CINCINNATUS 11 (1787), reprinted in 14 DHRC, supra note 41,
at 11, 12; BRUTUS 11 (1787), reprinted in 13 DHRC, supra note 41, at 524, 528.
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get their Constitution adopted.65 The public refused to be fooled, and the demand
for a Bill of Rights continued unabated. In short, the central fact about the
Founding generation's relationship to the idea that a Bill of Rights was unnecessary (or counterproductive) because the Constitution's enumeration of congressional powers would keep federal power in check is this one: they didn't buy it.66
The North Carolina convention at which Iredell compared the Constitution to a
power of attorney seems to have shared the general public's disdain for Iredell's
argument. Despite Iredell's urging that the Constitution was a great power of attorney and that a Bill of Rights would therefore be incongruous and even dangerous, the convention delegates not only refused to ratify but by well more than a
two-thirds majority approved a long list of rights that they wished to see written
into the Constitution by way of amendment before they would again consider ratification.6 7 Only in November 1789, after Congress approved rights-protecting
amendments and sent them to the states for ratification, did North Carolina relent.
In light of this repudiation of Iredell and his argument that further checks on federal power would be superfluous or ill-advised, it seems odd to treat a power-ofattorney analogy that Iredell offered in support of that argument as evidence of a
widely-held Founding view (or, in a more abstract formulation, as a reason to
think that a hypothesized reasonable Founder would have agreed).6 8
To be sure, we do not know exactly what the delegates who rejected Iredell's
pleas thought about his power-of-attomey claim, and in what proportion. Maybe
they thought it was preposterous to read the Constitution as Iredell was suggesting. Maybe they thought that his suggested reading was attractive but also were
pretty confident that the Constitution would not in fact be read that way if ratified.
Maybe they thought that the Constitution might be read that way but it also might
not, and "not" was sufficiently likely that it was not worth taking a chance. More
plausibly, maybe some of the delegates thought the first of those three things, and
others the second, and others the last. But regardless of how those delegates were
distributed along this spectrum, there does not seem to be any reason to read the
evidence as suggesting that the North Carolina delegates believed Iredell's

65. Consider the example of John Smilie, a leader of the anti-ratification forces in Pennsylvania, who
at the Pennsylvania convention basically dared Wilson to repeat his argument. See 2 DHRC, supra note
41, at 386.
66. For further treatment of this point, see Graber, supra note 59; see also Richard Primus, The
Limits of Enumeration, 124 Yale L.J. 576, 615-18 (2014).
67. 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 49, at 242-47 (committee report); id. at 250-51 (recording vote
of 184-84 in favor of approving the committee's report, with Iredell's name listed first among the losing
side).
68. One might argue that Iredell's power-of-attorney idea was actually much better accepted outside
North Carolina, such that its rejection in Iredell's own convention was a geographic accident that says
nothing about American opinion more broadly. After all, the argument could run, most of the states
ratified without demanding amendments first, so maybe North Carolina was an outlier on the point. But
in the absence of examples of the analogy's being articulated by other people, there is little basis for
assuming that people in other states accepted this particular idea.
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power-of-attomey prism would prevail in constitutional interpretation. Or even
that they thought it worth taking seriously.
If Iredell's speech were merely one of many Founding-Era sources analogizing
the Constitution to a power of attorney, the fact that Iredell's version of the argument flopped might not matter very much. But Natelson has no other examples of
anyone in 1787-1788 offering the power-of-attomey idea, and neither do Lawson
and Seidman. As noted above, I do not think there are many other examples to be
found. For anyone who would argue that the original meaning of the Constitution
is its meaning if interpreted as a power of attorney, this is a serious problem.
Lawson, Seidman, and Natelson do specify a few other occasions on which
they say Americans in 1787-1788 made the more general argument that the
Constitution should be interpreted with the rules applicable to some sort of fiduciary instruments (other than powers of attorney). But it is not clear that this more
general version of the thesis is adequately supported by evidence either. To be
sure, the Founding generation often used words that are at home in fiduciary settings when discussing the Constitution or government more generally. On inspection, however, the sources that are cited to show that the Founders regarded the
Constitution as a fiduciary instrument may not reveal anything about the
Founders' views about constitutional interpretation.
Consider the claim, in an article co-written by all three authors, that John
Marshall at the Virginia ratifying convention regarded the Constitution as "an
agency instrument that incorporates background presumptions familiar from
other fiduciary contexts"-presumptions that drive specific principles of textual
interpretation.6 9 In support of this proposition, they cite two pages from Elliot's
Debates. Lawson, Seidman, and Natelson do not explain why the statements
attributed to Marshall on the cited pages demonstrate a view about interpreting
the Constitution in accordance with rules appropriate to fiduciary instruments:
the point is simply asserted. And it is not obvious that the statements are sufficient
for that purpose. On the contrary, it seems a stretch to read Marshall as having
taken that position in any meaningful way.
The first of the two pages cited records Marshall's response to a delegate who
worried that Congress and the President would make bad laws and bad treaties.
Marshall's argument is given as follows:
I shall ask the worthy member only, if the people at large, and they alone, ought
to make laws and treaties? Has any man this in contemplation? You cannot exercise the powers of government personally yourselves. You must trust to agents.

If so, will you dispute giving them the power of acting for you, from an existing
possibility that they may abuse it? As long as it is impossible for you to transact
your business in person, if you repose no confidence in delegates, because there
is a possibility of their abusing it, you can have no government[.]7o

69. Lawson, Seidman & Natelson, FiduciaryFoundations, supranote 3, at 431.
70. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 49, at 225 (emphasis added).
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Marshall's argument here is pretty simple. In a polity too large to be governed
by a general meeting of all the members, the only possible government involves
delegating responsibility to a smaller number of people. And in the sentence I
have italicized, Marshall does use two words that figure prominently in agency
law. Those words are "trust" and "agents." But do Lawson, Seidman, and
Natelson really mean to say that Marshall's using those words tells us that he
believed the apparatus of agency law interpretation was applicable to the
Constitution? The interpretation of legal instruments is not even Marshall's topic
here. Does every use of the words "trust" or "agents" invoke the technical rules
of agency law?
Note too that Marshall in this passage is not talking about a feature of the
United States Government in particular. He is describing a fact about government
in general. Except in the smallest of all polities, all government involves the need
to do something Marshall here calls "trusting," and it involves doing that thing toward a group of people who are sensibly described as "agents." So if Lawson,
Seidman and Natelson are right, Marshall here would be asserting that except in
polities where all members can meet face-to-face, power-conferring documents
in every possible government must be interpreted as instruments of agency law. It
simply is not possible to have government on any other terms. That would be an
exceedingly strange view, and these passages are no reason to attribute it to
Marshall. The statement "you must trust to agents" need not entail any consequences about the relationship between government and the private law of
agency, any more than the statement "all of us are brothers" would mean that the
relationship among Americans should be governed by family law.
The other cited passage recording Marshall's remarks is also about the impossibility of the people's exercising the powers of government directly. It reads as
follows:
"Shall the people at large hold the sword and the purse without the interposition of their representatives? Can the whole aggregate community act personally? I apprehend that every gentleman will see the impossibility of this. Must
they, then, not trust them to others? To whom are they to trust them but to their
representatives, who are accountable for their conduct? ... [And if the power
is abused the People can assert themselves.] It is the people that give power,
and can take it back. What shall restrain them? They are the masters who give
71

it, and of whom their servants hold it."

Once again, the word "trust" appears. Indeed, it appears twice. And the last
sentence asks the audience to think in terms of master and servant, which is an
agency-law relationship. But again, it seems a stretch to think that Marshall here
is asserting that the Constitution must be interpreted with a legal apparatus taken
from the law of trusts, or that of master and servant. The word "trust" does not

71. Id. at 233 (emphasis added).
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always (or even usually) refer to something in agency law, and insisting that the
master-servant passage carries a commitment about the rules of legal interpretation would seem to require some lack of perspective about human speech. Just as
the single example of Iredell's speech is too thin to support the claim that
Americans at the Founding recognized the Constitution as a power of attorney,
sources like these are too thin to support the claim that Americans at the
Founding believed the Constitution should be interpreted with the specific devices of other kinds of agency law.
To their credit, Lawson and Seidman acknowledge that not every use of language used in agency law, or every statement that analogizes government to
some sort of fiduciary arrangement, is a signal that the speaker believes that technical rules of fiduciary interpretation should apply in the affairs of government.7 2
They conclude, however, that the totality of the evidence-"the sheer volume of
these references"-overcomes the problem.7 3 Their sense, as I understand it, is
that even if many Founding-Era uses of fiduciary language do not reflect the interpretive stance for which they argue, there are many examples that do reflect that
interpretive stance. As the leading repository of such vindicating references, they
cite Natelson's article The Constitution and the Public Trust.74 But in that article,
which cites a tremendous number of historical sources ranging across many centuries, Natelson produces no examples of Americans who, in the 1780s, clearly
took the position that the Constitution should be interpreted with technical rules
drawn from the law of agency. And if no examples (or almost no examples)
clearly support the thesis, it does not matter how many examples there are.
Natelson does produce some sources that might reflect the idea that the
Constitution should be interpreted like a fiduciary instrument, and he produces
many sources indicating that people at the Founding thought of government as
having fiduciary-like responsibilities as a matter of general principle-that government should govern in the interests of the people rather than in the interests of
the officeholders, and so forth. Natelson concludes that article by arguing that if
the Founders had that general attitude toward government, it makes sense to interpret the Constitution in a way that vindicates the relevant vision-for example,
with an eye to requiring that governmental power be exercised for the public welfare rather than for private gain. 7 5 I suspect that many well-socialized constitutional lawyers would find that argument plausible. But an argument at that level
of generality need not mean that any technical interpretive doctrines associated
with specific strains of agency law are transposable to the Constitution. So, given
the striking lack of evidence that people at the Founding thought that the
Constitution should be interpreted as if it were subject to the interpretive rules of
agency law, it seems possible, or indeed likely, that the Founding generation

72. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supranote 2, at 31.

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, supra note 3, at 1168.
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simply did not have that view-even if lots of people used fiduciary metaphors
when discussing the subject of government.
D. Post-RatificationSilence
As a further indicator that Americans at the Founding may not have understood
the Constitution to be sufficiently like a power of attorney so as to be interpreted
with the rules used for interpreting powers of attorney in agency law, consider the
use-or lack thereof-of that idea in congressional debates about constitutional
interpretation in the first years after the Constitution was adopted. If the powerof-attomey prism were an available heuristic for constitutional interpretation at
that time, Members of Congress who found themselves opposing proposed laws
on the grounds that the proposals exceeded the powers of the new government
would have had a strong incentive to remind their colleagues of a generally
shared or at least a generally accessible proposition: that the powers granted in
the Constitution must be construed strictly, because the Constitution should be
interpreted with the rules applicable to powers of attorney.
Natelson says that as a general matter he does not put much stock in postratification history when trying to identify the original meaning of the Constitution.
Once the Constitution was ratified, he points out, people had incentives to make
bad-faith arguments, or at least to engage in motivated reasoning, when doing
constitutional interpretation. 7 6 This concern is reasonable. For example, someone who wanted to argue for an ambitious public works program in 1795 might
advance a more expansive view of the Constitution's "provide for the general
welfare" language than might have occurred to reasonable readers in 17871788. But the same suspicion that people after ratification would have powerful
motives to characterize the Constitution in particular ways indicates that people
arguing for a narrow construction of congressional powers in the 1790s would
have jumped at the chance to make an available argument on their side of the
question. If the power-of-attomey idea was a common understanding among
Americans at ratification, or even just an available one, then people arguing for
narrow constructions of congressional power shortly after ratification would
probably have put the idea to use.
It is therefore instructive that there is no record of anyone's invoking the
power-of-attomey idea in the First Congress's debates about the extent of federal
power. Consider the 1791 debate over creating the first Bank of the United States.
For more than a week, the House of Representatives argued about the scope of
Congress's legislative powers. James Madison himself spoke at great length, and
more than once, about the (ostensible) importance of narrowly construing the
powers given to Congress. So did several of his colleagues. But so far as it
appears from the Annals of Congress, not once did anyone remind the House
that the Constitution was supposed to be interpreted with the restrictive rules for

76. Natelson, The Agency Law Origins of the Necessary and ProperClause, supra note 3, at 248.
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77
interpreting powers of attorney. Nor (with
one possible exception 78 ) do the
Annals record opponents of the Jay Treaty-another bitterly contested bit of lawmaking-invoking the power-of-attorney rubric. Nor opponents of the Alien and
Sedition Acts. These absences make it hard to be confident that any significant
number of Americans, at the time of the Founding, believed that a well-settled set

77. To my knowledge, the only occasion on which anyone in the Bank debate clearly drew on any
aspect of agency law, even at the level of metaphor, occurred near the very end of the debate, and it had
nothing to do with questions of how to interpret a legal text. According to the Annals of Congress,
Madison in his last intervention in the Bank debate argued, among other things, that the Bank as
proposed would give too much economic benefit to a set of wealthy stockholders and not enough to the
general public. In contending that Congress had a responsible to cut a better deal on the public's behalf,
Madison said "that the Government ought to consider itself as the trustee of the public on this occasion,
and therefore should avail itself of the best disposition of the public property." 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1959
(1791). Because the Annals are not a verbatim transcript, one should not make too much of the wording
of this passage. But it is still worth noting that the only appearance of agency-law thinking in the Bank
debate occurred as a form of policy criticism, not by way of explaining the principles that should
underlie the interpretation of Congress's powers.
Natelson, for his part, claims that during the Bank debate three Members of Congress-Fisher Ames,
James Madison, and Michael Jenifer Stone-treated the Necessary and Proper Clause "as an expression
of the incidental agency powers doctrine." Natelson, The Agency Law Origins of the Necessary and
Proper Clause, supra note 3, at 315 & n.363. But it is not clear why the passages cited from those
Members' remarks indicate that those Members thought they were drawing specifically on the private
law of agency. Ames described the Necessary and Proper Clause as establishing "the doctrine that
powers may be implied," which might or might not be a reference to agency law. 2 ANNALS OF CONG.
1904 (1791). Ames also analogized the government to a corporation, id. at 1905, and, to the extent that
he meant legal implications to follow, the result would be to vest the government with powers beyond
those enumerated-as was indeed Ames's view. See Richard Primus, "The Essential Characteristic":
Enumerated Powers and the Bank of the United States 117 MICH. L. REV. 415 (2018). The Stone
passage Natelson cites opposes the idea that the Constitution grants powers by implication, and again
nothing is said about agency law in particular. And the Madison passage Natelson cites does not seem to
say anything about agency law at all. It records Madison saying that the Constitution "is the great law of
the people, who are themselves the sovereign Legislature," and then quoting the preamble to ascertain
the purposes of the Constitution, and then arguing that the Constitution should be interpreted in light of
its purposes. 2 ANNALS OF CONG. 1947 (1791). Again, to read that argument as clear invocation of any
doctrine particular to agency law seems a stretch.
78. The Jay Treaty debates included the only two occasions of which I am aware on which Members
of Congress in the first decade after ratification adverted to powers of attorney in the course of
constitutional debates, and on neither occasion did the Member assert that the Constitution should be
interpreted with the rules applicable to powers of attorney. On the first of those two occasions, Daniel
Buck of Vermont-a Jay Treaty supporter-described the Constitution as "a sufficient letter of attorney
to the President and the Senate" to make the Treaty. 4 HISTORY OF CONG. at 711 (March 23, 1796)
(Statement of Rep. Buck). Buck also described the elected branches of the federal government as
"agents of the people." Id. But he did not develop either of these ideas in any way sufficient to support
his conclusion that interpretive rules applicable in the private law of agency were also applicable to the
Constitution. He might just have been speaking metaphorically, and in any event the crux of his
argument was to enable, rather than constrain, federal action. A short time later, South Carolina's Robert
Harper used the idea of a power of attorney conveying limited authority from principal to agent to argue
that the President and the Senate could make a treaty but needed the House's participation in legislation
to put that treaty into effect. Id. at 751. This second use of the power-of-attorney idea does emphasize
the idea of a limited grant of power, but it might not be a claim that the Constitution, as such, should be
interpreted with the rules applicable to powers of attorney. It might merely be using the power of
attorney idea as a way of illustrating the more general idea that certain grants of power are limited.
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of interpretive rules used for powers of attorney was also the set of rules to be
used for interpreting the Constitution.7 9 If that understanding had indeed been
widespread, why would the pitched battles over construing the powers of
Congress in the decade following have been fought without anyone's mentioning
that idea?
Perhaps there were uses of the power-of-attomey framing that were not captured by the inexact record that is the Annals of Congress. Or perhaps I missed
some invocations that really are there. But having looked, I have been able to find
at most one invocation of the idea that the Constitution should be interpreted as a
power of attorney, or more generically as a fiduciary instrument, in any congressional debate occurring in or before 1798.o (I stopped looking after that point.)
Again, I may have missed something. But even if a handful of comments escaped
my notice or were not properly recorded, it does not seem that the power-ofattorney frame was part of the customary apparatus of constitutional interpretation
in the first decade after ratification-not even among well-informed people who
had every incentive to argue for narrow constructions of congressional power.
E. The Elephant and the Tree
So here's where we are: Many scholars, with varying perspectives, have examined Founding-Era sources and concluded that there was no settled understanding
at that time about how to interpret the Constitution. Natelson argues that the
Constitution was a fiduciary instrument and that people generally understood it
that way. Lawson and Seidman emphasize one sort of fiduciary instrument-the
power of attomey-and argue that the Constitution should be interpreted in that
light. But the whole idea that the Founders believed that the Constitution should
be interpreted according to the particular rules of agency law rests on ambitious
inferences. Natelson produces many examples of Founding-Era Americans using
words that are used in agency law when discussing the government or the
Constitution, but not much reason is given to conclude that those Founding-Era
Americans meant that the technical interpretive devices of agency law should
carry over to constitutional interpretation. And there is precious little evidence
that anyone at the Founding-let alone most people at the Founding-thought
that the Constitution should be interpreted as if it were a power of attorney.
That's not to say that the Constitution bears no resemblance whatsoever to a
power of attorney. Both the Constitution and a typical power of attorney are legal
documents by which some authoritative actor empowers some other actor to exercise power, and in both scenarios the power is supposed to be exercised for the
benefit of the power-conferring actor rather than that of the power-exercising
actor. But that does not mean that we can understand what to do with the
Constitution by understanding what to do with a power of attorney any more than

79. If no significant number of actual Americans thought this way, it seems unlikely that a
hypothetical reasonable one abstracted from the whole would have done so.
80. The one possible exception is Harper's comment about the Jay Treaty, discussed supra note 77.
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we can understand how to interact with an elephant on the basis of understanding
how to interact with a wall, a snake, or a tree. The Constitution is, to put it simply,
not a private-law power of attorney, nor is it a private-law instrument of any other
kind. "The people" are not the same as a private client, and the project of structuring
and regulating a successful government differs wildly from the project of empowering and directing an agent to sell one's house. As I suspect the Founders understood.
Lawson and Seidman might demur. Several times in A Great Power of
Attorney, they explain that it is not their view that the Constitution is actually a
power of attorney. 1 They describe their argument as partial and conditional: to
the extent that the Constitution is like a power of attorney, certain consequences
follow for constitutional meaning.8 2 So in response to any argument that the
Constitution is not a power of attorney, or that neither Natelson nor Lawson and
Seidman have produced much evidence that the Founders believed the
Constitution would be interpreted as a power of attorney, Lawson and Seidman
can always say that they are not claiming otherwise. Not that they doubt the force
of the analogy; on the contrary, their own belief is that the Constitution is enough
like a power of attorney to drive a lot of constitutional interpretation.83 But if
readers are not prepared to go that far with them, readers should at least appreciate that the Constitution should be treated like a power of attorney to whatever
extent the power-of-attomey analogy is apt.84
But what if that extent is terribly small? If the historical record showed that the
power-of-attomey frame was one of a few major ways in which the Founders
envisioned constitutional interpretation, Lawson and Seidman could say that the
Constitution should be interpreted like a power of attorney to the extent that the
Founders thought about it that way, and their argument could have meaningful interpretive consequences. Given the thoroughgoing weakness of the historical evidence, however, the project is left with little purchase. One failed speech and a
bunch of questionable inferences cannot validly create anything like a sound interpretive frame. It is no doubt true that to the extent that the Constitution means
what it would mean if interpreted like a power of attorney, the Constitution means
what it would mean if the Constitution were a power of attorney. But it is also
true that to the extent that an elephant is like a tree, an elephant is like a tree. The
analogy does not improve our understanding of the elephant.

81. See, e.g., LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 2, at4
82. See, e.g., id. at 11.
83. "If we cannot draw a straight line from the interpretation of powers of attorney to the
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, we at least can construct a vector, of perhaps uncertain
magnitude, pointing in that direction. That is not a small matter. We actually believe that such a vector
covers most, if not all, of the relevant interpretative distance in many cases . .. ."Id. at 56.
84. Id. ("We actually believe that such a vector covers most, if not all, of the relevant interpretative
distance in many cases, but we can live with a lesser claim if we must.").
85. Again, there are things worth knowing about the elephant that are also true of the tree. For
example, it can important to understand that the elephant is large. But we grasp everything we need to
know about the elephant's size by direct observation of the elephant, without any need for the analogy.
See supra note 17.
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Lawson and Seidman surely appreciate this point. They know that their book
has persuasive value only to the extent that readers are willing to think of the
Constitution as a power of attorney. Indeed, the book is written as if it has trouble
holding to its official position that its claims are merely conditional. Over and
over, the text reads as if it is making actual claims about the Constitution-that
the Constitution is a power of attorney and should be interpreted as such-rather
than conditional claims about what would follow to the extent that those things
are true. Chapter One is called "What the Constitution Is-and Why it
Matters." 86 That question is restated on the book's first page as "what actually is
[the Constitution]?" 8 7 Lawson's and Seidman's text italicizes the word "is" to
stress that the question goes to the Constitution's actual nature; they describe that
question on that same first page as "existential."" The next two pages assert that
"correct characterization of the object of interpretation [i.e., the Constitution] is
critical"8 9 and indicate that such a correct characterization must "accurately situate[] the Constitution within the universe of documents known to eighteenthcentury makers of legal instruments."9 0 The book credits Iredell, on the basis of
his power-of-attomey speech, with being "[t]he person who most aptly identified
the Constitution's character." 9 1 This all sounds like an argument that it is correct
to think of the Constitution as a power of attorney. And if the goal of A Great
Power of Attorney is to generate ideas about constitutional meaning, then this
stronger argument is just what the authors need. An argument about what the
Constitution really is, if only it were accurate, would support claims about how
the Constitution should be interpreted.
Lawson and Seidman disclaim that stronger argument. They acknowledge differences between the Constitution and powers of attorney and, with a reasonableness that everyone should appreciate, insist only that the idea "works at least at
some level of analogy." 92 Which it does. In my own view, it works a little better
than several of the blind men's analogies about the elephant. But to know whether
it works well enough to play any important role in answering questions about
what the Constitution meant at the time of its adoption, one needs to know
whether Iredell's speech expressed an idea that many Americans would have
found persuasive at the time of the Founding. Neither this book nor the Natelson
work upon which it rests come close to establishing that proposition.

86. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supranote 2, at 1.

.

87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 3; see also id. at 11 ("The Constitution is a fiduciary instrument best categorized as a power
of attorney . .
92. Id. at 4.
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In the nature of constitutional argument, however, the central idea of A Great
Power of Attorney might have power even if its ostensible historical underpinnings are unsound. To the extent that constitutional law is shaped by original
meanings, it is shaped not by actual original meanings but by operative original
meanings-that is, by original meanings as understood and imagined by the real
people who exercise decisionmaking power. 93 Those people's conceptions of
original constitutional meanings are not totally unrelated to actual original meanings, but they are also not a direct function of actual original meanings. They are
combined products of history, myth, socialization, and what we might call "historical preferences," meaning not preferences held in the past, but rather preferences about the past-preferences about who the Founders were, what they stand
for, and how their story will be told. 94
In the complex shaping of operative original meanings, a pithy phrase or a
well-drawn image can do persuasive work, even if the history that the phrase or
image invites us to imagine differs from what a historian's careful and dispassionate reading of the historical record would show. Lin-Manuel Miranda took liberties with history, and his work product is surely changing intuitions about the
Founders and the Constitution. 95 For a more specialized audience, A GreatPower
of Attorney can do something similar. It offers a sharp and memorable idea about
how to understand the Constitution, one with enough intuitive plausibility that
people who are attracted to the conclusions it generates will likely make it part of
their good-faith apparatus for understanding the Constitution, regardless of the
accuracy of the historical claim.
I assume, of course, that Lawson and Seidman do not intend A Great Power of
Attorney to have persuasive effect to any degree beyond what the historical record would support. They are professors who wrote a book published by a university press, not artists staging a Broadway musical. As noted earlier, their text
repeatedly cautions that it reaches no conclusions about what judges or other constitutional decisionmakers should do, let alone historically unsupported ones. 96
They distinguish (as some other scholars also do 97 ) between constitutional meaning and constitutional law. Constitutional meaning, as they use the term, is the
communicative content of the document-by which Lawson and Seidman mean

93.

Cf. CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 150

(1890) ("No people are ruled by dead men, or by the utterances of dead men. Those utterances are only
law so far as they are voiced by some living power.").

94. See Richard Primus, The Functions of Ethical Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 79, 83-84 (2010)
(describing this kind of "historical preferences" and their role in constitutional interpretation).
95. See Richard Primus, Will Lin-Manuel Miranda Transform the Supreme Court?, ATLANTIC (June
4, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/06/lin-manuel-miranda-and-the-future-of-

originalism/485651/ [https://perma.cc/HJ5B-6N8S].
96. See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 2, at 172 ("We say nothing-literally nothing-about the
possible normative project.").
97. For a good discussion of this distinction, see Mitchell M. Berman, The Tragedy ofJustice Scalia,

115 MICH. L. REV. 783, 786-96 (2017).
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the originalcommunicative content of the document.98 Constitutional law, which
governs the action of public officials, is some product of constitutional meaning
as filtered through practical and institutional concems-and, Lawson and
Seidman say, moral concems 99-that lie outside the ratified text. Because constitutional meaning does not directly supply constitutional law, the authors say,
nothing that the book claims about constitutional meaning directly prescribes any
particular course of action for government officials implementing constitutional
law.100
Lawson and Seidman are correct, I think, that nothing in this book establishes
what constitutional decisionmakers should do. But I reach that conclusion for different reasons. For me, the first reason why nothing in A Great Power of Attorney
furnishes a reason for action is that I do not share the book's assumptions about
the authority of original meanings. As I have argued elsewhere, arguments about
the Constitution's eighteenth-century meaning rarely provide good reasons for
action in twenty-first century constitutional decisionmaking.ox Second, even if
eighteenth-century meanings were good bases for twentieth-century decisionmaking, this book would still not give reasons for action, because it does not supply persuasive evidence for its claim about eighteenth-century constitutional
meaning. The evidence that Natelson, Lawson, and Seidman offer is too thin to
establish that reasonable eighteenth-century Americans would have understood
the Constitution as a legal instrument that should be interpreted like a power of attorney to any consequential extent. So, because the historical claim is not
adequately supported and because that claim should not drive constitutional decisionmaking even if it were historically correct, I agree with the book's official
view that its argument has no normative consequences.
To stop there, however, would be to understate the book's probable impact. In
spite of its self-described limitations, A Great Power of Attorney strikes me as
likely to influence normative ideas about modem constitutional law. Note that the
applications Lawson and Seidman use to illustrate their (conditional) ideas about
constitutional meaning tend to involve current legal controversies. Much of the
book is devoted to exploring how the constitutional meaning that the authors
claim to establish would bear on modem legal questions, from the existence of a
federal eminent domain power 10 2 to the administrative state's tolerance for rulemaking delegationl 0 3 to the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act." Even

98. See, e.g., LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 2, at 169, 172.
99. See Lawson & Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, supra note 18, at 53-54.
100. See, e.g., LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 2, at 169, 172.
101. See, e.g., Richard Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 MICH. L. REv. 165
(2008).
102. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 2, at 95.
103. Id. at 104-29.
104. Id. at 91-99. In this context, Lawson and Seidman have in fact recommended that government
officials implementing constitutional law do pretty much what one would imagine if the arguments of
this book were straightforwardly translatable into legal doctrine. See, e.g., Brief of the Authors of The
Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause (Gary Lawson, Robert G. Natelson & Guy Seidman) and
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as the book disclaims direct normative applicability, it is persistently interested in
using its view of constitutional meaning to shape the reader's understanding of
issues with normative legal stakes. And as it happens, the proffered constitutional
meanings all align pretty well with a certain kind of libertarian values. 05 The
individual mandate, the exercise of eminent domain by the federal government,
and the fishy prosecution of poor Captain Yates are all shown to be inconsistent
with the meaning of the Constitution.
In this light, the idea that the book says nothing normative seems naive.
Regardless of its official modesty, A Great Power of Attorney does something to
alter the landscape of normative constitutional argument. It injects an image-the
image of the Constitution as a power of attorney, to be construed restrictivelyinto the discourse of constitutional lawyers. It tells readers that the Constitution
means certain things and does not mean other things. To be sure, it describes
those ideas as conditional, as warranted only so far as warranted, and as not determining constitutional law. But in the dynamics of constitutional persuasion, an
argument about constitutional meaning cannot help but drive normative legal
conclusions. The particular arguments that Lawson and Seidman develop about
what the Constitution means-or would mean, if the power-of-attomey frame
prevailed-are too tempting to be left lying around unused. As a meme of
thought, the quickly intuitive idea of the Constitution as a power of attorney will
do its own work, regardless of whether its historical foundations are sound.
Lawson and Seidman might respond that they are just doing their jobs as scholars. They call things as they see them, and they describe constitutional meaning
as they best understand it, and if other people misread their book as proving
things it does not prove, well, Lawson and Seidman cannot be held responsible
for other people's carelessness. On its own terms, that's a cogent position. As a
general rule, it seems right to say that scholars should not abstain from writing
things they think to be correct when carefully stated just because other people
might adopt the ideas in less careful ways.
Nonetheless, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the book will be read as an
argument of the very kind that the authors disclaim. On this score, one of the
most instructive texts one reads when reading this book is not a text written by
Lawson and Seidman at all. It is a blurb on the back cover by Steven G.
Calabresi. The blurb begins as follows: "'A Great Power of Attorney' is the best
book written about judicial interpretation of the Constitution in my lifetime!"

the Independence Institute as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Dep't of Health & Human Servs.
v. Florida,567 U.S. 519 (2012) (No. 11-398) (arguing, based on the premise that the Constitution should
be interpreted like an eighteenth-century fiduciary instrument, that the individual mandate of the
Affordable Care Act was unconstitutional).
105. Lawson and Seidman say that their analysis produces "a wide, and quite eclectic, set of
interpretative implications, some of which surprised even us." LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 2, at 11.
But it is not clear that any of those implications points to a constitutional meaning unfriendly to
normative libertarianism. Instead, all of the implications seem like good news, from a libertarian point
of view.
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For someone who has absorbed Lawson and Seidman's explanation that their
book is not about the behavior of government officials, that sentence must be puzzling. In what is surely intended as a statement getting to the crux of why people
should read the book, Calabresi describes A Great Power of Attorney as being
about something that the authors insist they do not address: judicial interpretation. Judicial interpretation of the Constitution, as opposed to interpretation simpliciter, is an activity of government officials. It is shaped by the distinctive
institutional role that courts play as wielders of coercive power. The book repeatedly insists that questions about how government officials do or should execute
their offices are beyond the book's strictly delimited investigation of constitutional meaning. In Lawson and Seidman's words, "We are interested in constitutional meaning, not constitutional authority or justification... . We make no
claims about the extent to which that meaning either does or should drive decisions about read-world conduct."106 But the back cover advertises the book as
essential reading on the subject of what judges do.
We all know the injunction against judging books by their covers. In this case,
perhaps the blurb on the back is not one that Lawson and Seidman wanted.
Perhaps it was chosen carelessly by an intellectually imprecise publisher-or
deliberately by a goal-oriented one who reasoned that "This is an important book
about judges and the Constitution" would sell more copies than "This is a book
with no normative argument." 107 But regardless of how it got there, the blurb says
something accurate about how the book will be received. A Great Power of
Attorney raises the profile and the status of a provocative but inadequately supported idea about how to read the Constitution. Despite its authors' disclaimers,
the book will function as a conduit through which Natelson's tendentious rendering of history is delivered in ready-to-use form to the community of constitutional
law advocates. To the extent that the book executes that function, it will inspire
constitutional arguments-normative arguments, arguments about what courts
should do-that traffic in original meanings but which misperceive the Founders.
In particular, it will inspire arguments that obscure the fact that the Founders'
major project was the creation of a bigger, stronger, and more centralized national
government.
CONCLUSION

At a time when the President of the United States shows astonishingly little
compunction about wielding political power for his own personal enrichment, it
seems wise to take advantage of any opportunity to assert that government officials must use their authority for the public welfare and never for private gain.
One shorthand way to make that point is by saying that government under our
Constitution is a public trust. Similarly, analogizing the Constitution to a power

106. See, e.g., id. at 5.
107. See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 2, at 172 ("We say nothing-literally nothing-about the
possible normative political project.").
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of attorney can be salutary if it reminds people who exercise governmental power
that they are required to act for the sake of something other than their own benefit.
It does not follow, however, that anything else from the agency-law apparatus of
trusts or powers of attorney must inform constitutional interpretation. Such analogies are useful only as accessible illustrations of a general idea, not as proposals
to transpose rules from the context in which they were developed to some other
context that might require a different approach.
Fundamentally, the idea that the Constitution should be interpreted on the
model of a power of attomey-or indeed that of any private-law instrumentrisks a mistake that political theory identified long ago. That mistake is the
attempt to model public politics too closely on private or family affairs."os What
works in one realm frequently does not work in the other. To impose the rules
appropriate in either sphere on activities conducted in the other is often a recipe
for the failure of the relevant project.
The possibility that government cannot succeed if it is treated as just one more
entity subject to the rules of private law would, for me, be a sufficient reason not
to impose such rules in the realm of government. But Lawson and Seidman may
think differently. One of the most important passages in A Great Power of
Attorney comes in the form of a disclaimer even greater than the disclaimer of
normative consequences for constitutional law. As if to stress how far they mean
to stay from actual legal arguments, Lawson and Seidman adopt a position of agnosticism on something like the very possibility of government. "We also emphasize," they write, "that we are making no claims about actual political authority,
about the normatively binding quality of the Constitution, or indeed about
whether there is any such thing as binding political authority." 10 9 That statement
is both an expression of intellectual modesty and a doubling down on the book's
animating skepticism toward governmental power. Agnosticism toward the binding quality of the Constitution or even about the possibility of binding political
authority more generally is skepticism about the moral acceptability of govemment itself. In other recent writing, one of the book's authors has eloquently communicated the view that, indeed, government is a nasty thing, one whose projects
should be described with terms of opprobrium. 1 That deep skepticism toward
the moral acceptability of government is not developed in A Great Power of
Attorney. But it is, perhaps, the elephant in the room.

108. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS, bk. 1, § 1. Among modem treatments of this theme, I am
partial to JUDITH SHKLAR, ORDINARY VICES (1984) (arguing that many traits or practices that are

morally blameworthy in private life are not morally blameworthy in politics and government).
109. LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 2, at 61.

110. See Gary Lawson, Reflections of an Empirical Reader (Or: Could Fleming Be Right This
Time?), 96 B.U. L. Rev. 1457, 1477 (2016) ("[T]o tell judges and other officials how to decide cases ...
means telling judges and other officials who to shoot, whose lives to control, and whose wealth to seize.
That is, of course, what pretty much everybody in the world of constitutional interpretation except me is
trying to do, and the conflicts among the contending theorists reduce to who gets shot, whose lives get
controlled, and whose wealth gets seized.").
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If one is uncertain whether government can be morally acceptable, then perhaps one will not be bothered by the idea that government should be treated as if
it were something that is not government at all. But if one thinks that any sound
conception of morality must have room for authoritative government-as I doand if one is confident that the constitutional government of the United States
legitimately commands our obedience-as I am-then one must read the
Constitution in ways that let that government accomplish what it needs to do, as a
government, rather than treating it as something else that cannot accomplish what
a government must accomplish. It is the latter perspective that centrally animated
the project, more than two hundred years ago, of adopting a Constitution that
would create a more powerful and more effective national government.

